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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LEROY MICKEY, an individuaL 
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vs. 
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PETRONELA HALINGA, an individual, 
Appellants/Defendants 
and 
BENONE ENTERPRIZES, INC.. an Alaska 
Corporation, d/b/a TIME OUT SPORTS PUB 
& RESTARUANT. 
Defendant. 
I Supreme Court No. 39973 
District Court Case No. CVOC 1203491 
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of the State of Idaho. in and for Ada County 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper. District Judge. Presiding 
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Attorneys for Respondent 
1. Michael Kulchak, ISB 4181 
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2627 W. Idaho Street 
Post Office Box 637 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0637 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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I. STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside a default jUdgment. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondent filed his summons and complaint on February 28, 2012, seeking damages for 
failing to pay wages allegedly due and breach of contract against Benone Enterprises, Inc. and by 
way of an allegation of alter ego against Appellants. R. pp. 5-10. 
On March 1, 2012, Respondent filed three affidavits of service claiming that the summons 
and complaint were served by leaving same with Appellant Petomela Halinga at her residence at 
7:23 p.m. R. pp. 21-24 
On March 22,2012, Respondent filed a motion for default. R. pp. 25-26 
On March 23, 2012, the court entered its order of default and default judgment. R. pp. 37-43. 
On April 17, 2012, Appellants filed a motion to set aside default and default judgment. R. 
pp.44-45 
On May 18, 2012, the court entered its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part 
Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default. The court found that the corporation was not properly 
served and set aside the default with respect to the corporation but refused to set aside the default 
and default judgment against the Appellants finding that they had failed to show excusable neglect. 
R. pp. l35-136. 
Appellants filed their notice of appeal on May 21,2012. R. pp. 138-141 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Benone Enterprises, Inc. was incorporated in the state of Alaska on May 31, 2005 and was 
authorized to do business in Idaho on May 21, 2007 and has filed its annual reports in Idaho since 
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2008. R. pp. 91-94. Benone Halinga ("Benone") is the registered agent of the corporation. It 
obtained a certificate to do business as Time Out Sports Pub & Restaurant on March 4, 2011. R. 
pp.86-90. 
Benone Enterprises, Inc. has its own EIN number and bank account. The funds of the 
corporation are not co-mingled with the Appellants' personal funds. Until the restaurant was closed 
in March, 2012, Benone Enterprises, Inc. had employees, paid wages and taxes in it own name. R. 
p.87. 
The corporation's had an arrangement with Leroy that upon opening of the restaurant, which 
occurred in June, 2011, when Leroy Mickey ("Leroy") filled out his W -4, he would become an 
employee and be entitled to 10% of the profits during his employment. All monies paid to Leroy 
prior to June, 2011 were advances against future earnings. In fact it is noted as an advance at the 
bottom of each check. R. pp. 87, 96-103. 
In August, 2011, Plaintiff brought a claim for unemployment benefits against Benone 
Enterprises. Inc. alleging that it was his employer from October 2010 through July, 2011. R. p. 87. 
All alleged agreements in Leroy's complaint were between him and the corporation and not 
Appellants personally. Additionally, all payments made to Leroy were made by the corporation and 
he has been paid all amounts that he is owed. R. pp. 50, 54 
Petronela was neither an officer or shareholder in Benone Enterprises Inc. and was not 
authorized to accept service on behalf of the corporation. She was self employed as a estheticion at 
Sensations Salon, 12375 West Chinden Blvd., Suite D, Boise, Idaho 83713. She had never a 
business related conversation with the Leroy and had no authority to act on behalf ofthe corporation. 
R. pp. 53-54, 86. 
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On February 29, 2012, the date ofthe alleged service (which allegedly occurred at 7:23p.m.), 
Petronela was working at Sensations Salon until 8:00 p.m. when she closed the salon. On February 
29,2012, Benone was in Alaska on business and in fact renewed his Alaska Driver's license on 
February 14,2012. He did not return to Boise until the first week of March, 2012. R. pp. 49-50. 
Petronela claimed that she was never served with, receive a copy or was aware of the summons and 
complaint in the instant action and both appellants claim that they were not aware that a lawsuit had 
been filed until after judgment was entered in this case and their bank accounts had been garnished. 
As soon as the Appellants became aware of this lawsuit they retained counsel to set aside the 
judgment. R. pp. 50, 53-54 
IV. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the Appellants failure to timely answer the complaint was the product of 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and therefore should be set aside pursuant to 
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
B. Whether the judgment against the Appellants was void for lack of service and should 
be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)( 4). 
C. Whether the default and judgment should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)( 6) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds the judgment against the corporation was set aside 
and the liability of the Appellants was based upon the theory that the corporation was their alter ego 
and unless the corporation is found liable there can be no basis for piercing the corporate vale 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 60(b) motion permits a district court to grant relief from a judgment based on mistake, 
newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, misconduct, or void or satisfied jUdgments if 
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filed within six months. First Bank & Trust ofIdaho v. Parker Bros., Inc., 112 Idaho 30, 32, 730 P.2d 
950, 952 (1986). The decision to grant or deny relief pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion is within the 
discretion of the trial court. Pullin v. City of Kimberly, 100 Idaho 34, 36,592 P.2d 849,851 (1979), 
See also, Hearst Corp. v. Keller, 100 Idaho 10,592 P.2d 66 (1979) (motion to set aside default 
judgment governed by discretionary standard). An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's 
discretionary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Northwest Roofers & Employers Health & Sec. 
Trust Fund v. Bullis, 114 Idaho 56, 753 P.2d 267 (Ct.App.1988). Because judgments by default 
are not favored, a trial court should grant relief in doubtful cases in order to decide the case on the 
merits. Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 287, 221 P.3d 81,85 (2009). A court's refusal to set aside 
entry of default is reviewed for abuse of discretion. McGloon v. Gwynn, 140 Idaho 727, 729, 100 
P.3d 621,623 (2004); McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931, 933,854 P.2d 274, 276 (Ct.App.l993). 
Where the trial court makes factual findings that are not clearly erroneous, applies correct criteria 
pursuant to the applicable legal standards to those facts, and makes a logical conclusion, while 
keeping in mind the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases and resolution on the merits, the court 
will be deemed to have acted within its discretion. See, Idaho State Police ex reI. Russell v. Parcel 
I: Lot 2 in Block 3,144 Idaho 60, 62, 156 P.3d 561,563 (2007); Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 
117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005); Shelton v. Diamond Int'l Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 938, 703 P.2d 699,702 
(1985); Avondale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 326, 658 P.2d 992,997 (Ct.App.l983). 
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VI. ARGUMENT. 
A. THE APPELLANTS FAILURE TO TIMELY ANSWER THE COMPLAINT 
WAS THE PRODUCT OF MISTAKE, INADVERTENCE, SURPRISE OR 
EXCUSABLE NEGLECT AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(B)(1) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
Rule 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which 
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, 
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior jUdgment upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and 
(3) not more than six (6) months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. Such motion does not require l.eave from the Supreme Court, or the 
district court, as the case may be, as though the judgment has been affirmed or settled upon 
appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the power of a court to: (i) entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or (ii) to set 
aside, as provided by law, within one (1) year after judgment was entered, a judgment 
obtained against a party who was not personally served with summons and complaint either 
in the state ofIdaho or in any other jurisdiction, and who has failed to appear in said action, 
or (iii) to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. 
In the instant case the trial court determined that there was not excusable neglect and therefor 
denied Appellants motion to set aside the default and default judgment. The trial court's reasoning 
in determining the there was no excusable neglect was based upon its assumption that it was more 
probable than not that Petronela was not telling the truth in her affidavit when she claimed that she 
was not home at the time the process server claimed he served her with the summons and complaint. 
Ir. pp. 19-20. It based this determination on its conclusion that the process server had less 
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motivation to lie under oath than Petronela. Tr. p. 19. 
In this case both the process server and Petronela made their statements under oath. Both 
subjected themselves to charges of perjury for submitting a false statement under oath. Taking the 
court's analysis to its logical conclusion a process server's affidavit will always trump a party's 
affidavit and you would never be able to challenge service. This is not consistent with the policy that 
default judgments are not favored in the law and that in doubtful cases to allow relief so that 
judgment can be rendered on the merits. Herzinger, 109 Idaho at 19,704 P.2d at 351; Orange 
Transportation Co. v. Taylor, 71 Idaho 275,280-81,230 P.2d 689,692-93 (1951). 
Even if the court was correct in its analysis that the burden of proof was not sustained by 
Petronela, which it was not, the decision to refuse to set aside the judgment against Benone cannot 
be supported. The court held that it was not excusable neglect for Petronela not to call it to Benone' s 
attention of the pending law suit. Tr. 28. 
What constitutes excusable neglect is determined by the facts and surrounding circumstances 
of the particular case involved Schraufnagel v. Ouinowski, 747 P.2d 775,777, 113 Idaho 753, 755 
(Idaho App. 1987). 
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Benone was in Alaska at the time service of process 
was allegedly made. Even though service upon his spouse, if made, would be proper service, failure 
ofPetronela to bring it to his attention is excusable. The court's analysis was focused on the action 
ofPetronela in failing to apprise Benone of the lawsuit. The correct analysis is from the perspective 
of Ben one. The trial court must determine whether the litigant "engaged in conduct which, although 
constituting neglect, was nevertheless excusable because a reasonably prudent person might have 
done the same thing under the circumstances." Schraufnagel, 113 Idaho at 754, 747 P.2d at 776. 
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(Emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that Benone was unaware of the summons and complaint and thus his 
requirement to respond. Upon learning of the judgment against him he quickly obtained counsel and 
moved to set it aside. This is precisely what a reasonably person would have done. 
Based upon the above facts and cases cited above, the judgment against Appellants should 
be set aside. At the very minimum the jUdgment against Benone should be set aside. 
B. THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANTS WAS VOID FOR LACK 
OF SERVICE AND SHOULD BE SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO RULE 
60(B)(4). 
Under Rule 60(b)( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a default judgment may be set 
aside when that judgment is found to be void. Generally, where a party has not been served with 
process or was improperly served with process, any judgment against such party is void. Thiel v. 
Stradley, 794 P.2d 1142, 1143, 118 Idaho 86, 87 (Idaho 1990). 
In the instant case, Benone was in Alaska at the time of the alleged service and Petronela was 
at her salon. Neither of the parties had any knowledge of the summons or complaint. The process 
server, at the time of service, had no idea what Petronela looked like. There is no indication he 
asked the person whom he claimed to have served for identification. 
There was not proper service and as such the judgement is void and should be set aside. 
C. THE DEFAULT AND JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE PURSUANT 
TO RULE 60(B)(6) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Under Rule 60(b)( 6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may relieve a party from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for" any ... reason justifying relief from the operation ofthe 
judgment." Although the court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to grant or 
deny a Rule 60(b) motion, its discretion is limited and [the motion] may be granted only on a 
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showing of' unique and compelling circumstances' justifYing relief." Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 
345,349,924 P.2d 607,611 (1996). 
In this case, the judgment against Benone Enterprises, Inc. has been set aside. The liability 
ofthe Appellants is based entirely upon the allegation that Benone Enterprises, Inc. is their alter ego. 
Tr. 24. 
As stated by the trial court: 
And the fact of the matter is, the court is - I'm truly struggling, trying to figure out 
what I am to do where a jUdgment was entered against the husband and wife, yet on the 
merits of the case it may very well be that jUdgment - that if the case when to trial, it would 
be determined that judgment should never have been entered against them because of the 
plaintiff s inability to pierce the corporate veil. 
As indicated in the statement of facts, Benone Enterprises, Inc. was incorporated in the state 
of Alaska on May 31, 2005 and was authorized to do business in Idaho on May 21, 2007 and has 
filed its annual reports in Idaho since 2008. R. pp. 91-94. Benone Halinga ("Benone") is the 
registered agent of the corporation. It obtained a certificate to do business as Time Out Sports Pub 
& Restaurant on March 4, 2011. R. pp.86-90. 
Benone Enterprises, Inc. has its own EIN number and bank account. The funds of the 
corporation are not co-mingled with the Appellants' personal funds. Until the restaurant was closed 
in March, 2012, Benone Enterprises, Inc. had employees, paid wages and taxes in it own name. R. 
p.87. 
Because the liability of the Appellants is based solely on the ability of the Respondent to 
pierce the corporate veil and the judgment against the corporation has been set aside, the 
circumstances are sufficiently unique and compelling to justifY relief from the judgment and it 
should be set aside. 
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VII. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the above argument and authorities, the judgment against the Appellants should 
be set aside. 
DATED this __ day of October, 2012. 
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KULCHAK & ASSOCIATES 
By_----' 
J. Michael Kulchak - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of October, 2012, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Daniel W. Bower 
Gabriel M. Haws 
BELNAP, STEWART, TAYLOR & MORRIS, 
P.L.L.C. 
12550 W. Explorer Drive, Suite 100 
Boise, Idaho 83713 
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[ 'f'U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 345-4461 
